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ADVISORY OPINIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 
MOVING BEYOND A PYRRHIC VICTORY 
JULIE CALIDONIO SCHMID* 
INTRODUCTION 
In theory, advisory opinions are authoritative but usually 
nonbinding statements or interpretations of international law by an 
international tribunal or arbitral body.1  Since advisory opinions do 
not bind states, international bodies can issue opinions relating to a 
state’s internal affairs without obtaining that state’s consent.  They 
are also in theory less confrontational than contentious cases because 
states are not parties and do not have to defend themselves against 
formal charges.2  Overall, advisory opinions are said to be “soft” law 
because they are not binding.3  Absent a binding legal obligation, 
advisory opinions must encourage, but not compel, states to behave in 
a certain manner.4  Yet, in practice, the recent International Court of 
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 1. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory 
Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties]. 
 2. Id. (stating that advisory opinions are non-binding because the state is not present to 
represent itself); Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights Law, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
241, 246 (2002) (stating that advisory opinions are meant to be less confrontational). 
 3. Judicial decisions in contentious cases are said to be “hard” because states have given 
the court jurisdiction to issue binding opinions; advisory opinions are said to be “soft” because 
in most instances states have not given the court jurisdiction to issue binding opinions.  José E. 
Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 427 
(2003).  Alvarez also states that even contentious decisions of the ICJ are “soft” given that they 
are not enforced and the uncertainty of enforcement norms, such as whether a state has a 
continuing obligation to comply with an ICJ decision if the Security Council  considers and 
rejects a plea to enforce ICJ rulings.  Id.  He notes that even for contentious cases, the Security 
Council has enforced only one ICJ decision against Libya and only with that state’s 
concurrence.  Id. at 416 (citing JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, 
ACTORS, PROCESS 3-12 (2002) (discussing the sole example, Territorial Dispute (Libya v. 
Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3)). 
 4. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 246. 
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Justice (ICJ) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 
(IACHR) advisory opinions suggest attempts at using this soft law to 
impose binding obligations on states through their development of 
international custom and treaty norms.  To the praise of some and the 
displeasure of others, the courts are arguably eroding state 
sovereignty by using advisory opinions to rule on state practice even 
though the state has not consented to the court’s jurisdiction. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, several studies were conducted regarding 
the general use and scope of the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ and 
the IACHR.5  Yet, a study specifically analyzing the use of advisory 
jurisdiction in relation to human rights cases and law is needed given 
the ICJ and the IACHR’s recent human rights advisory opinions.  
These opinions include the ICJ Construction of a Wall opinion and 
the IACHR Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and 
Migrant Worker opinions.  These opinions reflect both courts’ 
elevation of individual rights over state rights.  Yet, this active 
advisory jurisdiction raises questions regarding the jurisdictional 
power of advisory courts.  These questions concern what states and 
entities can request advisory opinions, whether the opinions create 
any binding obligations on states through interpretations of binding 
treaty and custom norms, and how much power such opinions have 
on states that have not consented to the advisory courts’ jurisdiction. 
The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) decision in Mara’abe v. The 
Prime Minister of Israel illustrates these concerns.6  In Mara’abe, the 
ISC considered what obligations the ICJ’s holding in the Construction 
of a Wall opinion placed on Israel when the ISC examined the legality 
of Israel’s separation wall.  Although eventually diverging from the 
ICJ’s opinion, the ISC deferred to the non-binding opinion because it 
held that the ICJ’s interpretation of international law should be given 
full weight.  The ISC’s attention to the ICJ opinion is especially 
important given that Israel vehemently fought against the legality of 
the ICJ’s right to issue the opinion in the first place.  Yet, ultimately, 
the ISC argued that the ICJ did not base its opinion on full factual 
information, and used this rational to disregard the ICJ opinion and 
 
 5. See KENNETH JAMES KEITH, THE EXTENT OF THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE passim (1971) (discussing the advisory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ); DHARMA PRATAP, THE ADVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 
passim (1972) (discussing the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ); Thomas Burgenthal, The 
Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Right’s Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 passim 
(1985) (describing the Inter-American Court’s advisory opinion jurisprudence). 
 6. For a discussion on Mara’abe, see infra Part II.A. 
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invoke its own domestic law for analyzing the legality of the wall.  
The entire wall, as designated by the ISC, was not against 
international law, as the ICJ had held.  This holding illustrates how 
the theoretical desire for advisory jurisdiction to play an important 
role in the development of human rights norms will fall short in the 
absence of states willingly accepting, adopting, and applying the 
norms developed in advisory opinions.  Examining the weaknesses in 
the system will offer insight on how to achieve the desired state 
compliance in the absence of any binding legal or judicial 
enforcement. 
Further, the development and use of advisory jurisdiction by the 
ICJ and the IACHR is important in relation to how other human 
rights courts will utilize their advisory power, including the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the recently created African 
Court of Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).  The issue is most 
prevalent relative to the ACHPR as it contains broad advisory 
jurisdiction. 
Thus, this Note first compares the theoretical construct of 
advisory power to its role in practice.  Part I of this Note presents an 
overview of how the advisory jurisdiction provisions of the ICJ, 
IACHR, ECHR, and the ACHPR operate in theory.  Second, given 
that the ECHR has not used its advisory power, and the ACHPR is 
not yet operational, this Note discusses how the ICJ and the 
IACHR’s use their advisory jurisdiction in practice.  Part II focuses 
on the ICJ’s recent use of advisory jurisdiction in human rights cases, 
and Part III focuses on the IACHR.  In Part IV, this Note compares 
the advisory opinions of the ICJ and the IACHR and identifies the 
possible effects of an active advisory jurisdiction in human rights.  It 
also proposes salutations on how to make these opinions have a more 
effective influence on the development of human rights norms and 
obligations. 
I.  INTERNATIONAL COURTS’ USE OF ADVISORY 
JURISDICTION 
Various international courts have advisory jurisdiction.  This 
Note focuses on advisory jurisdiction and human rights, and, 
therefore, focuses primarily on the international courts that have 
advisory jurisdiction and deal with human rights.  These include the 
ICJ, the IACHR, the ECHR, and the ACHPR. 
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A. The ICJ 
The ICJ bases its advisory jurisdiction on the principle “that a 
qualified international intergovernmental organ, and not an 
individual State or group of States, may ask the Court for an advisory 
opinion on legal questions.”7  Furthermore, unlike decisions with 
which states must legally comply, states do not have the legal 
obligation to comply with advisory opinions. 8  Under the predecessor 
to the ICJ, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), only 
organs representing states, including the League Council and 
Assembly of the League, could ask for advisory opinions.9 
During the period of the PCIJ, states determined whether to 
consult the court, as well as the terms of the consultation, ’by 
consensus.10  This prevented the advisory power from being used 
excessively by one state.11  Further, under the PCIJ, the opinions 
requested were rarely abstract and the legal nature of the questions 
was rarely contested.12  Michla Pomerance, in The Advisory Role of 
the ICJ and its Judicial Character, stated: 
[T]he desire of the Court not to permit the advisory function to 
adversely affect the judicial character, prestige, and general 
standing of the Court in the world community, was powerfully 
buttressed (save in the Eastern Carelia and Customs Union 
aberrations) by the steady practice of the League Council and the 
organs whose legal questions it transmitted.  This joint League-
Court legacy was to undergo radical changes in the period of the 
UN and the International Court of Justice.13 
These “changes” under the United Nations Charter included 
extending the right of the General Assembly to grant advisory 
opinions to other organs of the United Nations (U.N.) and 
 
 7. ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 86 (Terry D. Gill 
ed., 6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ROSENNE]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. League of Nations Covenant art. 14; Protocol Concerning the Revision of the Statute of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, annex, arts. 65-68.  The Assembly never utilized 
its advisory power.  ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 15. 
 10. Except in the Status of the Eastern Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 5 (July 23) and Mosul Boundary Case, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12 (Nov. 21), as noted by 
Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Role of the ICJ and Its Judicial Character, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 285 (A.S. Muller et. al. eds., 1997). 
 11. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 87. 
 12. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 284. 
 13. Id. at 285. 
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Specialized Agencies.14  Currently, all principal agencies of the United 
Nations (except the Secretariat) and the Specialized Agencies are 
now authorized to request advisory opinions.15  The organizations 
authorized by the General Assembly can only request advisory 
opinions on legal questions arising “within the scope of their 
activities.”16  Under Article 96(1), the Security Council (S.C.) and 
General Assembly (G.A.) have no such explicit restriction, suggesting 
they have a broader advisory jurisdiction.17  Yet, Kelsen maintains 
that the words “arising within the scope of their activities” in Article 
96(2) of the U.N. Charter are redundant because the Security Council 
and the General Assembly can only act if it is under their 
jurisdiction.18  Determining their jurisdiction means making sure that 
the organ is not acting outside its scope of activity.19  Thus, despite the 
 
 14. U.N. Charter art. 96 states: “(1) [T]he G.A. or the Security Council may request the 
International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.  (2) Other 
organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized 
by the General Assembly, may also request an advisory opinion of the Court on legal questions 
arising within the scope of their activities.” 
 15. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 88.  The inclusion of the Secretariat was championed by 
Stephen Schwebel, the former President of the International Court of Justice, in his note, 
Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 869 (1984).  Schwebel argued that Article 96 
allows the United Nations to grant advisory authority to any organ.  Id. at 869-70.  Given that 
the Secretariat is an organ, the GA may authorize the Secretariat to request advisory opinions 
from the court.  Id.  If the Secretariat or the Secretary General was given the authority, they 
would be limited to questions arising within the scope of their activities.  See U.N. Charter art. 
96, para. 2.  Yet, the Secretary-General acts in all meetings of the General Assembly, Security 
Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, and their subsidiary organs; thus, 
all the activities of such organs are arguably within the scope of the activities of the Secretary 
General.  Schwebel, supra at 874.  In 1992, then Secretary-General Dr. Boutros-Ghali, in his 
Agenda for Peace, recommended that the Secretary-General be authorized to take advantage of 
the advisory competence of the Court.  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, U.N. 
GAOR, 47th Sess., item 10 of the prelim. list at 11, U.N. Doc. A/47/277, S/24111 (June 17, 1992).  
Yet, the General Assembly and Security Council did not act on this suggestion. 
 16. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 2.  Although twenty-one organs and agencies can use the 
advisory process, it has only been used once by the S.C., three times by the Committee on 
Applications for review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments, twice by ECOSOC, twice by the 
WHO, once by UNESCO, and once by IMCO.  See Cesare P.R. Romano, International 
Organizations and the International Judicial Process: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 3, 22-
23 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2002). 
 17. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1. 
 18. HAN KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS 
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 546 (1950). 
 19. Id. 
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lack of an explicit restriction under Article 96(1), the ICJ should not 
accept cases where any organ is acting outside its jurisdiction.20 
The ICJ statute also provides the ICJ with discretionary power, 
allowing it to decline to give advisory opinions.21  It states that the ICJ 
“may give” an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request 
of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the 
Charter of the U.N. to make such a request.22  Overall, the ICJ has 
limited its discretional power to instances of “compelling reasons.”  
Over the years, many reasons have been invoked, but none have been 
found sufficiently compelling.23 Instead, the ICJ has only refused a 
request for an opinion once based on lack of jurisdiction.24  Despite its 
discretionary power, the ICJ has not rejected an advisory opinion 
request based on objections from countries claiming that the advisory 
jurisdiction is being used to circumvent the ICJ not having 
contentious jurisdiction over the state.25 
Thus, since its inception in the PCIJ, the ICJ’s advisory 
jurisdiction has arguably increased in scope given that more entities 
can access it.  Yet, the ICJ has only issued twenty-six advisory 
opinions in the last fifty years, compared to the twenty-seven of the 
PCIJ in less than two decades.26  The key difference, however, rests 
not on the number of advisory opinions issued, but on which organs 
are using the advisory authority, and what type of opinions are being 
 
 20. This may possibly arise in cases where the General Assembly is acting to request an 
advisory opinion on a matter already addressed by the Security Council.  Further, it could arise 
in areas where members not subject to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court find themselves 
subject to the Court’s review. 
 21. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 65, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 
[hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 298. 
 24. See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 561, para. 24 (July 8).  See also H.E. Judge Shi Jiuyong, President of the 
ICJ, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 5, 
2004) (transcript available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/SPEECHES/iSpeech_ 
President_Shi_Speeches_SixthCommittee_20041105.htm) (citing the Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict as the only opinion where the ICJ held it lacked 
jurisdiction to reply to a request submitted to it) [hereinafter Speech of ICJ Judge Shi].  The ICJ 
rejected the request from the WHO “because the request did not relate to a question within the 
scope of the activities of that Organization as required by Article 96, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter.”  Id. 
 25. See, e.g., the discussion infra Part II on the Western Sahara and the Construction of a 
Wall advisory opinions.  See sources cited infra notes 66 and 68 for Western Sahara and the 
Construction of a Wall, respectively. 
 26. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 291. 
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requested.  During the PCIJ era, the Assembly of the League, the 
body now represented by the General Assembly, had authority to 
request advisory opinions.  Yet, all advisory requests were initiated by 
the League Council, the body now represented by the Security 
Council, and focused on disputes.27  Now, the majority of advisory 
requests come from the General Assembly, and rarely focus on 
“interstate disputes.”28  The current legal questions mirror the types 
of contentious cases usually brought before the ICJ when a state has 
given the ICJ contentious jurisdiction.  This switch highlights a shift in 
power dynamics between the General Assembly and the Security 
Council, where factions within the G.A. can use their power to 
request opinions on issues that the S.C. has chosen not to address.  
Further, the ICJ facilitates this shift in power dynamics in favor of the 
G.A. by accepting jurisdiction over the requests when the ICJ has the 
power to decline them.  The effects and interpretation of the ICJ’s 
advisory opinions will be discussed in Part II. 
B. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The IACHR has “competence with respect to matters relating to 
the fulfillment of the commitments made by the States party to the 
Convention.”29  Unlike its contentious jurisdiction, the advisory 
jurisdiction of the IACHR can be utilized without additional state 
consent, and the opinions are not binding.30  Under the statute, an 
Organization of American States (OAS) party has an absolute right 
to request an advisory opinion under both paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
 
 27. Pomerance notes that the different political backdrop of the PCIJ and the ICJ may 
explain each court’s use of the advisory procedure.  Id.  The League of Nations operated to 
enforce a Peace Settlement or to maintain the status quo, so advisory jurisdiction was used as a 
vital tool to enforce this end.  Id.  The United Nations operated within the East-West divide, 
which created friction in the organization and made using the advisory function to solve legal 
problems more problematic.  Id. at 294 (stating that the legitimacy of turning to the ICJ was 
quite regularly contested under the ICJ era, “usually on the grounds that the question was not 
‘legal’—or, at least not ‘essentially’ so”). 
 28. Id. at 292.  Pomerance further argues that, if disputes are implicated, they are “not 
strictly interstate but rather between the Organization and a single state (or group of states).”  
Id. 
 29. Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., OEA/Ser.L./V/II.82, doc. 6 rev (1948) [hereinafter Basic Documents].  The 
American Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978 and established the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights.  Buergenthal, supra note 5, at 1. 
 30. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 249 (noting that, although the advisory opinion is not 
binding like a Court’s judgment in a contentious case, “it does have undeniable legal and moral 
effects on both national and international law”).  See also Basic Documents, supra note 29, at 15 
(describing the IACHR’s jurisdiction). 
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Article 64, even if the state is not a state party to the American 
Convention.31  Likewise, states that have not ratified the American 
Convention may find themselves subject to review of the IACHR.32 
In general, the right of states to access the IACHR is unique to 
the IACHR, as the ICJ does not allow any states to utilize the 
advisory mechanism.  Terry Gill, editor of the World Court and How 
it Works, is critical of allowing states to access the advisory 
mechanism.  Gill argues that the difference between “access” to 
contentious jurisdiction and “access” to the advisory procedures is 
that in the former a state could go to the court on its own 
responsibility, while the latter requires the concurrence of other 
states.33  Thus, allowing individual states to access the advisory 
function of the IACHR would be to allow states to substitute the 
advisory jurisdiction for the contentious—”a real distortion of the 
true function of the Court.”34  IACHR legislative history, however, 
demonstrates that the drafters wanted to design the advisory 
jurisdiction in the “broadest terms possible.”35 
To further broaden the IACHR’s power, the drafters also 
extended the advisory right to the organs listed in Chapter X of the 
 
 31. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 64, 
para. 1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention] (“[T]he member 
states of the Organization my consult the Court regarding the interpretation of the Convention 
or of other treaties on the protection of human rights in the American states.  Within their 
spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the 
court.”); see also American Convention art. 64, para. 2 (“[T]he Court, at the request of any 
member state of the Organization, may provide that state with opinions regarding the 
compatibility of any of the said States domestic laws with the aforementioned international 
instruments.”).  Importantly, the request must be made by someone in authority to speak for 
government, and states cannot use Article 64 to obtain an opinion on another state’s domestic 
law, even if the law has a possible effect on the requesting state.  See Pasqualucci, supra note 2, 
at 253. 
 32. The IACHR’s authority over members of the OAS requires placing the relation 
between the IACHR and the OAS in perspective.  The OAS General Assembly adopted the 
statute of the IACHR, and this is seen as providing the authority of the IACHR to oversee all 
OAS members.  Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 2 n.9 (quoting OAS Charter art. 60) (“The Court 
shall draw up its Statute which it shall submit to the [OAS] General Assembly for approval.”).  
The OAS General Assembly approved the Court in October 1979, and the Statute entered into 
force on January 1, 1980.  Id. 
 33. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 87. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 250 n.53 (citing “Other Treaties” Subject to the 
Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, 
para. 17 (Sept. 24, 1982)).  Despite the broad jurisdiction, the Court cannot bring an advisory 
opinion on its own motion.  Id. at 253. 
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OAS charter.36  Organs may only seek advisory opinions “within their 
spheres of competence.”37  In Effect of Reservations, the IACHR held 
that the petitioning organ must show a “legitimate institutional 
interest” in the legal question posed in the request.38  Initially, each 
organ decides whether the request falls within its sphere of 
competence.  Yet, the IACHR makes the final determination by 
reference to the OAS charter and the constitutive instrument and 
legal practice of the particular organ.39  The majority of advisory 
opinions are requested by states or the Inter-American Commission.40 
The IACHR’s jurisdiction covers (1) questions regarding 
interpretation of the American Convention under Article 64, 
paragraph 1; (2) questions relating to the interpretation of “other 
treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American 
states” under Article 64, paragraph 1; and (3) requests pertaining to 
whether a state’s domestic laws are compatible with the American 
Convention or “other treaties” under Article 64, paragraph 2.  The 
IACHR in all instances is limited to interpretation of legal questions.  
Like the ICJ, the IACHR is given discretion to decide when to issue 
an opinion.41  The IACHR bases its opinion on “considerations that 
transcend merely formal aspects.”42 
Under the IACHR’s Rules of Procedure, all member states once 
informed of an advisory request can participate in public hearings and 
submit briefs.43  Despite not being mentioned in the IACHR’s statute, 
the IACHR also allows amicus briefs.44  In advisory opinions, the 
 
 36. Now under ch. VIII, art. 53 of the amended OAS Charter by the Protocol of Buenos 
Aires, including the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, the Councils, the Inter-American Judicial Committee, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights, the General Secretariat, the Specialized Conferences, and the Specialized 
Organizations.  Id. 
 37. American Convention art. 64, para. 1. 
 38. Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 4 n.18 (citing Effect of Reservations on the Entry into 
Force of the American Convention, Advisory Opinion, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) No. 2, 
para. 14 (Sept. 24 1982)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 255 (“Notwithstanding the advantages that would accrue 
to organs that request advisory opinions, the Inter-American Commission is the only organ that 
has availed itself of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction to date.”). 
 41. American Convention art. 64, para. 1. 
 42. Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of 
the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, paras. 31, 
42 (Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Consular Relations]. 
 43. Rules of Procedure of IACHR art. 52, paras. 1-2 ((Dec. 8, 2000), reprinted in Basic 
Documents, supra note 29, at 136. 
 44. Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 15. 
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IACHR joins jurisdictional objections to merits of the request.45  The 
IACHR has also held that once states request an advisory opinion, 
such a request cannot be withdrawn.46  The IACHR argued that other 
states may have an interest in the matter before it.47 
The IACHR’s broad jurisdiction has led to several challenges.  
States have argued that the Inter-American Commission should not 
be allowed to ask for advisory opinions on a state’s domestic laws.  In 
International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of 
Laws,48 Peru argued that, by doing so, the Commission encroached on 
the state’s right to request an advisory opinion in regard to its 
domestic law.49  Peru claimed that the Commission was seeking “to 
obtain indirectly what it is prevented from achieving directly.”50  The 
IACHR held that the Commission had standing to request the 
advisory opinion under Article 64 because the Commission had the 
function to consult with member states on how to ensure their 
domestic laws comply with the American Convention.51  The effects 
and interpretations of the IACHR opinions will be discussed in Part 
III. 
 
 45. See Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) No. 3, paras. 21-23 (Sept. 8, 1983).  Court stated it made no sense in a contentious case “to 
examine the merits of the case without first establishing whether the parties involved have 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.”  Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 17 (citing Restrictions to the 
Death Penalty, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3, para. 21).  However, in advisory 
proceedings, the same is not true.  Id. 
 46. Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. A) No. 15, para. 28 (Nov. 14, 1997) (contra the PCIJ, which allowed withdrawal of 
request). 
 47. Id. para. 28. 
 48. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in 
Violation of the Convention, Advisory Opinion, 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, para. 
12 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter International Responsibility] (citing Peru as arguing that, under 
Article 64(2) of the IACHR, only those states “whose domestic laws are at issue, are 
empowered to resort to the Court’s advisory jurisdiction when there is a perceived 
incompatibility between one of their domestic norms and the Convention”). 
 49. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 254 (citing Peru’s discontent with the court when the 
Commission, in International Responsibility, 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, para. 12, 
asked the court for an advisory opinion when the state broadened application of its death 
penalty). 
 50. Id. (quoting International Responsibility, 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, 
para. 12). 
 51. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 254. 
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C. The European Court of Human Rights 
Compared to the ICJ and the IACHR, the ECHR has limited 
advisory jurisdiction. The ECHR may only give advisory opinions on 
“legal questions concerning the interpretation of the European 
Convention and the protocols thereto.”52  The subject matter is 
limited to questions that do not relate “to the content or scope of the 
right or freedoms defined in [those instruments], or with any other 
question which the [European] Court or the Committee of Ministers 
might have to consider in consequence of any such proceeding as 
could be instituted in accordance with the Convention.”53  Given this 
limited jurisdiction, only one advisory case has been brought before 
the ECHR.  In that case, the ECHR declined to review the case based 
on lack of jurisdiction.54 
D. The African Court of Human and People’s Rights 
The ACHPR is the most recent human rights court created and 
has broad advisory jurisdiction power.  The Protocol states that the 
ACHPR may render advisory opinions on “any legal matter relating 
to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instrument, 
provided the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter 
 
 52. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 47, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 53. Id. 
 54. In May 2004, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe requested the 
Court, under Article 47 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (“the European Convention”), to give an advisory opinion on the 
matter raised in Recommendation 1519(2001) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, concerning “the co-existence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on 
Human Rights,” and the implications for states which had ratified both Conventions.  Press 
release issued by the Registrar, First Decision on Court’s Competence to Give an Advisory 
Opinion, European Court of Human Rights, June 2, 2004, http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/ 
Press/2004/June/DecisiononAdvisoryopinion.htm [hereinafter First Decision on Court’s 
Competence]; ECHR, Grand Chamber, Annual Activity Report 2002, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/5CD0E552-0D28-4A95-B335-
6DB669C7E078/0/2002GrandChamberactivityreport.pdf.  The Court stated that Article 47(2) 
sought to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction on the legal questions submitted to it where the Court 
may be called in the future to address in its “primary judicial function” the examination of the 
admissibility or merits of concrete cases.  Id.  As applied to the case before them, the Court 
noted it was possible that the procedure under the CIS Convention might later have to be 
examined in a substantive application to determine whether it was a “procedure of international 
investigation or settlement.”  Id.  Therefore, the court held that the request for an advisory 
opinion was not within the Court’s competence as defined in Article 47 of the Convention.  Id. 
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being examined by the African Commission.”55  The ACHPR’s 
proposed jurisdiction authorizes member states of Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) (now called the African Union (AU)), the AU, 
any AU organ, and any African organization recognized by the AU 
to request advisory opinions.56  These opinions would not be binding, 
but the ACHPR could use them as a reference for interpretations of 
the African Charter of Human Rights and other Human Rights 
Conventions.57  The necessary ratification for the ACHPR was 
reached early in 2004, but the ACHPR is still not functional.58  Yet, 
the ICJ and IACHR’s use of their advisory power could demonstrate 
what role the ACHPR’s broad advisory jurisdiction will have on 
human rights. 
II.  THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE’S ADVISORY 
JURISDICTION IN PRACTICE 
The above descriptions indicate that international courts may be 
relying on a broad advisory jurisdiction to oversee human rights laws.  
Those opinions are meant to be “soft” and non-binding.  Yet, José 
Alvarez, in his article The New Dispute Settlers, depicts this “soft law” 
as a half-truth because international adjudicators are hardening 
previous soft law norms in their soft law decisions.59  For instance, he 
notes that it is unlikely that states would predict that a “merely” 
advisory opinion by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
could turn the “soft” declaration on the rights and Duties of Man into 
 
 55. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment 
of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights, art. 4, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (111) (June 9, 1988), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/rule_prot/africancourt-humanrights.pdf. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Association for the Prevention of Torture, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: Presentation, Analysis and Commentary: The Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, establishing the Court I.B. (Jan. 2000), http://www.apt.ch/ 
africa/African%20Court.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2006). 
 58. Stephen Mbogo, African Union Creates Continent-Wide Rights Court, Jan. 27, 2004, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ForeignBureaus/Archive/200401/FOR20040127d.html; Project on 
International Courts and Tribunals, African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 
http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ACHPR.html (stating that “[t]he statute of the ACHPR has not 
yet been promulgated and a seat for the court has yet to be determined, therefore much of the 
data regarding its functioning is not yet available”). 
 59. Alvarez, supra note 3, at 427 (citing Loayza Tamayo, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 33, para. 80 (Sept. 17, 1997) (holding that parties to the American Convention “[have] the 
obligation to make every effort to apply with the recommendations” of the Inter-American 
Commission)). 
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a binding obligation on all members of the OAS. 60  Arguably, this was 
not foreseeable to all or most OAS members when they adopted the 
Statute of the Court granting the IACHR the power to issue non-
binding advisory opinions.  Yet, this is the reality of advisory 
jurisprudence, as advisory opinions often interpret binding custom 
and treaty norms.  As a result, states could limit their entanglement 
with the soft law human rights regimes.  Further, states could also 
narrowly construe advisory opinions by distinguishing the issuing 
courts’ interpretation of facts.  This would effectively limit the 
theoretical goals of advisory jurisdiction to advance human right 
norms.  Thus, the next two Parts of this Note look at how the ICJ and 
the IACHR have utilized and defined their advisory jurisdiction in 
practice. 
A. The ICJ’s Interpretation 
It has been argued that many ICJ opinions, particularly those 
involving advisory jurisdiction, “reflect a teleological, even dynamic, 
interpretation of the U.N. Charter.”61  These interpretations differ in 
scope and breadth from the PCIJ and in turn define how the ICJ 
perceives its role as an advisory consultant.  The ICJ broadly views its 
advisory power, as evidenced by the fact that the ICJ does not view 
state consent as a bar, has never turned an opinion down for political 
reasons despite having the power to do so, and has accepted an 
advisory opinion from the General Assembly on a matter already 
pending before the Security Council.  Each of these issues will be 
addressed below. 
First, the ICJ held that state consent is not needed where the 
’ICJ’s reply is “only advisory” and has “no binding force” even in 
situations where the request relates to a legal question actually 
pending between two states or is actually a matter pending before a 
domestic court.62  There have been five prominent cases where the 
 
 60. Alvarez, supra note 3, at 426 (citing Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in 
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449, 451 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (reference to advisory 
opinion)). 
 61. Id. at 431 (citing José E. Alverez, Constitutional Interpretations in International 
Organizations, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 104 (Jean-Marc 
Coicaud &Veijo Heinsakanan eds., 2001)). 
 62. Peace Treaties, 1950 I.C.J. at 71 (holding that the Court could render an advisory 
opinion).  See also ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 173-74 (stating that the Court construes it has 
jurisdiction over dissenting state opposition to the opinion and acting contrary to the principles 
04__CALIDONIO SCHMID.DOC 8/1/2006  3:03 PM 
428 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:415 
ICJ has dealt with issues of non-consent, including Peace Treaties,63 
Namibia,64 Western Sahara,65 Privileges and Immunities,66 and the 
Construction of a Wall67 opinion.  Yet, unlike the PCIJ in the Eastern 
Carelia opinion, for the most part, the ICJ minimized the “quasi-
contentious aspects” and instead emphasized that the opinion was 
given to the organization for its enlightenment.68  Members of the ICJ 
disagreed over the implications that advisory opinions had in actual 
application.  In his dissent in the Peace Treaties case, Judge Winiarski 
argued that the ICJ minimized the force of advisory opinions.69  He 
noted that “states see their rights, their political interests, and 
sometimes their moral position affected by an opinion of the Court, 
and their disputes are in fact settled by the answer which is given to a 
question relating to them[.]”70  The ICJ also refused to recognize the 
objections of states in advisory opinions involving application of 
provisions where the ICJ’s opinion would have a binding effect.71  
 
of the PCIJ); infra notes 87-91 (discussing the ICJ decision to issue the Construction of a Wall 
opinion despite the ISC issuing a decision on the same matter.) 
 63. Id. (holding that the Court could render an advisory opinion despite states’ objections). 
 64. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 
1971 I.C.J 16 (June 21, 1971) (addressing arguments over the competence of the Court to hear 
arguments regarding the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia). 
 65. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J 12 (Oct. 16) (despite Spain’s objection, 
the ICJ ruled anyway and unanimously held that the land was not terri nullis at time of Spanish 
colonization).  The ICJ held that there were legal ties between the territory and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and there were legal ties between the territory and the Mauritanian entity.  Morocco 
refused to accept the court’s holding.  This resulted in guerilla conflict plaguing the area which is 
still unresolved.  The opinion also caused a strain in relations between Morocco and Algeria, 
who claimed a stake in the area.  ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 174. 
 66. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (Dec. 15) (stating that the 
immunities provision is applicable in the case of Mr. Dumitru Mazilu as a special rapporteur). 
 67. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J 131 (July 9) [hereinafter Construction of a Wall]. 
 68. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 299. 
 69. Id. at 300 (citing Peace Treaties, 1950 I.C.J. at 89). 
 70. Id. (citing Peace Treaties, 1950 I.C.J. at 92). 
 71. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1989 I.C.J. 177, paras. 37-39 (Dec. 15).  
The ICJ stated that it had recognized in its earlier jurisprudence that in “certain 
circumstances . . . the lack of consent of an interested State may render the giving of an advisory 
opinion incompatible with the Court’s judicial character.”  It stated that such instances would be 
when “the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the 
principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement 
without its consent.” (citing Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12).  The Court held that in the present 
case to give a reply would have no such effect.  Id. 
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Pomerance argues that, in exercising both its contentious and 
advisory jurisdiction, the ICJ asserts jurisdiction over what previously 
would have been questionable grounds.72 
In Construction of a Wall,73 an important human rights opinion, 
the ICJ rendered an advisory opinion on the legality of the separation 
wall being built in Israel.  Israel objected to ICJ jurisdiction because, 
inter alia, the advisory process was being invoked to circumvent the 
fact that Israel had not given the ICJ jurisdiction over the wider, 
contentious dispute between Israel and Palestine.74  In Western 
Sahara, the ICJ had noted that it did not have to render an advisory 
opinion when it would have the “effect of circumventing the principle 
that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to 
judicial settlement without its consent.”75  Further, the ICJ could have 
invoked the precedent of the PCIJ case the Status of the Eastern 
Carelia.76  Yet, the ICJ in Construction of a Wall stated that “lack of 
consent to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction by interested States 
has no bearing on the Court’s jurisdiction to give an advisory 
opinion.”77  Rather, the ICJ stated that the issue involved a broader 
question that was “of particularly acute concern to the United 
Nations[.]”78 
The ICJ’s decision to hear the case was most significant because 
the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) was already hearing a case on a 
similar matter.79  This raises the issue of whether the ICJ should have 
refrained from giving an opinion when a domestic court is addressing 
a similar question.  On June 30, 2004 (one week before the ICJ 
opinion), the Israeli Supreme Court in Beit Sourik Village held that a 
forty-kilometer stretch of fence was illegal.80  Although only 
 
 72. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 307. 
 73. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J 131, para. 1. 
 74. Id. para. 46. 
 75. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J at 25. 
 76. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 95, 
para. 15 (July 8) (citing Status of Eastern the Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) 
No. 5 (July 23)) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (stating that the Court could not reply to a 
question put to it because it concerned an existing dispute and “one of the state parties to which 
was neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of 
Nations”). 
 77. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, 151-52, para. 47. 
 78. Id. at 155, para. 50. 
 79. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Government of Israel [2004] IsrSC, draft 
available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.NSF/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/380fd102b 
1711ea48525705a00524cf6/$FILE/HCJ%20ruling.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004). 
 80. Beit Sourik Vill., HCJ 2056/04, para. 62. 
04__CALIDONIO SCHMID.DOC 8/1/2006  3:03 PM 
430 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 16:415 
considering a small portion of the fence, it was argued by anti-wall 
advocates that, upon close scrutiny, the decision “makes a very strong 
case against the Wall in general though its ruling only regarded only 
one small 40 km stretch of the Wall.”81  The ISC reached its decision 
using a more domestically acceptable proportionality argument.82  
The ICJ used less commonly accepted specific treaty/convention law 
in its opinion.83  Thus, the ISC decision held that the wall, albeit the 
small forty-kilometer portion was illegal based on traditionally 
accepted legal norms of proportionality.84  This is an easier argument 
for the Israeli people to accept, rather than a opinion from the ICJ 
that effectively appears to be commandeering Israel’s domestic 
agenda. 
After the ISC decision, the ICJ released Comments on the Israeli 
Supreme Court decision of June 30, 2004.85  The ICJ stated: 
[The Israeli Supreme Court] judgment reflects that even the fight 
against terrorist acts must be conducted within the rule of law and 
not by abrogating the law. . . .  [T]he broader practical value of this 
decision will be judged on whether the Israeli Government urgently 
re-evaluates the Barrier, not only in this 40 km stretch, but along its 
 
 81. John Sigler, The Israeli High Court of Justice and the Apartheid Wall, THE ELECTRONIC 
INTIFADA (Jul. 15, 2004), http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article2916.shtml. 
 82. Id.  The ISC decision used the general legal principles of proportionality, a legal 
concept more Singler argues is more acceptable to Israeli’s than ICJ’s invocation of Israel’s 
international obligations stemming from international treaties and conventions.  Id.  In 
particular, the third element of the Israeli proportionality test requires determining whether the 
administrative authority chose the proper and most moderate means of achieving its objective. 
The proportion between the benefit and the damage to the citizen must be proportionate.  The 
ISC analyzed proportionality based on the general normative structure of their legal system, 
which recognizes human rights and the necessity of ensuring the provision of the needs and the 
welfare of the local inhabitants that preserve “family honour and rights.”  Id. (noting that all 
these are protected in the framework of the humanitarian provisions of the Hague Regulations 
and the Geneva Convention). 
 83. Id.  The ISC used proportionality to conclude that seven of the eight confiscation 
orders under review to be illegal. Id.  Yet, Sigler contends that the Israeli ruling is not all good, 
as it falsely characterizes all Palestinian resistance as “terrorism.”  Sigler, supra note 81 (citing 
Beit Sourik Vill., HCJ 2056/04, para. 1 (stating that “[t]he forces fighting against Israel are 
terrorists: they are not members of a regular army; they do not wear uniforms; they hide among 
the civilian Palestinian population in the territories, including inside holy sites; they are 
supported by part of the civilian population, and by their families and relatives”). 
 84. But see Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04 at para. 59 (where, instead of focusing on different 
interpretative norms, the ISC noted the difference between the ICJ ruling and The Beit Sourik 
Case as a lack of factual information before the ICJ, which prevented the ICJ from concluding 
that the wall was a military necessity). 
 85. ICJ Comments on the Israeli Supreme Court Decision of Beit Sourik Vill., 
http://www.nad-plo.org/palisraeli/wall/primary/israelicourt.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
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entire route and swiftly makes substantial changes based on the 
reasoning set out by the three judges.86 
The comments highlight the ICJ’s satisfaction with Israel’s invocation 
of the “rule of law.”  The ICJ called on the Israeli government to re-
evaluate the whole barrier in light of the Beit Sourik holding.  Yet, on 
July 15, 2004, the ICJ released the opinion condemning the wall.  
Given the Beit Sourik decision, it may have been more desirable for 
the ICJ to delay releasing its opinion to see how the Israeli 
government reacted to their own domestic decision.  Instead, the ICJ 
opinion highlighted Israel’s responsibility under international law.87  It 
stated that Israel “has the obligation to cease forthwith” construction 
of the wall and dismantle the completed portions.88  Further, the ICJ 
stated that all off Israel’s regulatory and legislative acts authorizing 
construction of the wall “must forthwith be repealed or otherwise 
neutralized.”89  The ICJ concluded that Israel was obligated “to make 
reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons 
concerned,”  and that included  paying damages to anyone adversely 
affected and returning land or olive trees taken from any person and 
used in constructing the wall.90  The language used, such as 
“responsibility” and “cease forthwith,” suggested binding 
obligations.91 
Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court in Mara’abe v. The Prime 
Minister of Israel (2005)92 considered the ICJ’s ruling in the 
Construction of a Wall opinion.  The ISC’s consideration of the ICJ 
opinion represents an important example how such non-binding 
opinions can arguably create binding obligations through the ICJ’s 
interpretation of international treaty and custom norms.  For 
example, although the ISC stated that the ICJ holding was not 
binding on Israel, the ISC noted that the opinion would still be 
considered because “the opinion of the [ICJ] is an interpretation of 
international law, performed by the highest judicial body in 
international law. . . .  The ICJ’s interpretation of international law 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 147. 
 88. Id. para 151. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. para. 153.  The ICJ majority also stated that other States have legal obligations as a 
result of Israel’s activities.  Id. para. 154. 
 91. Id. paras. 150-51. 
 92. HCJ 7957/04 [2005] IsrSc, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/ 
a14/04079570.a14.HTM (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
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should be given its full appropriate weight.”93  The ISC noted that the 
ICJ’s Construction of a Wall opinion and the ISC’s decision in the Beit 
Sourik Village case were based on common norms.  Yet, the ISC 
stated the two courts reached different outcomes.  The ICJ said the 
wall was illegal per se, whereas the ISC found there was a military 
necessity to erect the fence and that each segment must be analyzed 
to determine if it disproportionately affected each resident’s right.94 
The ISC stated that the ICJ and ISC decisions on the wall 
differed in their conclusions because of the different factual basis 
upon which each court made its decision.95  The ICJ made its factual 
opinions from the Secretary-General’s report, his written statement, 
the Dugard report, and the Zeigler report.  The ISC made is factual 
opinions from information from Palestinian petitioners, from the 
state, and from military experts who requested the opportunity to 
present their position as amici curiae.96  The ISC noted that the ISC 
was presented with substantial information regarding the military 
necessity to build the fence; yet, the military necessity was mentioned 
only minimally in the sources upon which the ICJ based its opinion.97  
According to the ISC, Israel presented such information to the ICJ, 
but this information did not make its way into the ICJ’s opinion.98 
The ISC also noted that the dissenting judges in the ICJ 
Construction of a Wall opinion noted the paucity of factual 
information.99  Further, the ISC noted that the factual information in 
regards to the infringement upon local residents’ rights was “far from 
precise” and included figures that Israel believes are “exaggerated,” 
“not precise,” and “completely baseless.”100The ISC concluded that, 
although it shall give full weight to the norms of international law 
developed by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion, the ICJ’s conclusion—
based on a factual basis different than the one before them—was not 
 
 93. Id. para. 56. 
 94. Id. para. 59. 
 95. Id. para. 61. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. para. 63 (noting that the SG report contained only one line to the security-military 
need; the SG written statement did not mention it at all; the Dugard report and Zeigler report 
have no data on the issue). 
 98. HCJ 7957/04 [2005] IsrSc, para 63, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/ 
04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.HTM (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
 99. Id. para. 64 (citing Construction of the Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, Judge Burgenthal’s dissent) 
(“I am compelled to vote against the Court’s finding on the merits because the Court did not 
have before it the requisite factual basis for its sweeping findings.”). 
 100. Id. para. 67. 
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res judicata.  As such, the ISC said it would continue to examine each 
segment of the fence in relation to the norms of international law and 
will not hold the whole fence as violating international law as per the 
ICJ opinion.101 
The ISC’s discussion in Mara’abe highlights both how such 
opinions can be considered binding through the ICJ’s interpretation 
of international law; and how a domestic court can easily dismiss or 
distinguish the advisory holding, thus ultimately allowing its own 
domestic law to control.  The ISC’s criticism of the ICJ’s opinion 
reflects an inherent view that the ICJ’s opinion was political based on 
facts supplied by those requesting the opinion.102  Further, Israel 
contends that the facts they provided to the ICJ did not make it into 
the opinion.  Advisory opinions are different from contentious cases 
in regards to what information the court considers and what 
mechanisms a party has to represent itself.  Thus, using the ICJ 
advisory power to rule on what in reality is a contentious case 
prevents the party, in this case Israel, from having the opportunity to 
fully represent itself.  This can ultimately lead to opinions that appear 
factually biased. 
The second way the ICJ broadly interprets its advisory power is 
that, as noted above, it has never turned down a request for political 
reasons even though it is authorized to do so under Article 65.103  For 
instance, after declining the Nuclear Weapons request by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), it granted the same request by the 
G.A.104  The ICJ accepted the opinion even though   it was an abstract 
question and that in answering the question the ICJ could arguably be 
assuming a legislative role.  Despite the fact that it was the first 
advisory opinion by the ICJ to deal with a question not relating to 
matters currently before the requesting body, the ICJ deferred to the 
G.A.’s judgment. .  The ICJ held that “the question put to the court 
has relevance to many aspects of the activities and concerns of the 
 
 101. Id. para. 74. 
 102. But see Sigler, supra note 81 (stating that Israel falsely concludes that all Palestinian 
resistance is terrorism). 
 103. See Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 44.  In this opinion, the ICJ noted that 
it had not rejected the WHO opinion request because it asserted a political question.  Id. para. 
44; see also Speech of ICJ Judge Shi, supra note 24 (“Furthermore, the Court has, to this day, 
never found that political arguments surrounding a legal question put to it, constituted a 
compelling reason for it to decline to exercise its advisory jurisdiction.”). 
 104. Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95, para. 19. 
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G.A. including those relating to the threat or use of force in 
international relations.”105 
The ICJ also refused to apply discretion in the Construction of a 
Wall opinion.106  The ICJ concluded that the lack of consent from 
Israel and the fact that the opinion could adversely affect the 
negotiation process currently taking place in the Middle East at the 
hands of the Security Council did not constitute “compelling reasons” 
to use its discretion.107  The ICJ again downplayed the possible effects 
the opinion could have on the already volatile situation.  The ICJ 
noted that, although states may have an interest in the outcome of the 
advisory opinion, that alone would not deprive the ICJ from 
exercising its discretion.108  The ICJ asserted that it gives its opinion to 
the United Nations as a whole, rather than to individual states.  The 
ICJ also affirmed its own power, noting that the advisory function 
allowed the ICJ to reflect its appropriate “participation in the 
activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be 
refused.”109 
Third, it is evident that the ICJ broadly interprets its advisory 
power because it accepted an advisory opinion request by the G.A. 
on a matter already addressed by the S.C.  In doing so, the ICJ has 
engaged in a quasi-judicial review of the S.C.110  The language of 
Article 96(1) states that the Security Council or the General 
Assembly “may request the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any 
legal question.”111  The ICJ has stated that, despite the language of 
Article 96(1), it may require “certain indications as to the relationship 
between the question the subject of a request for an advisory opinion 
and the activity of the General Assembly.”112  Under this 
 
 105. Id. para 12. 
 106. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 163(3).  See also id. (Buergenthal, J. 
dissenting) (noting that there are “serious questions,” and that—although he agreed with many 
parts of the advisory opinion—he was “compelled to vote against the Court’s findings on the 
merits because [it] did not have before it the requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings; it 
therefore should have declined to hear the case”). 
 107. Id. paras. 27, 47, 65. 
 108. Id. para. 47. 
 109. Id. paras. 44, 47 (citing previous ICJ decisions reflecting this discretionary power). 
 110. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 3, at 431 (citing José E. Alvarez, Judging the Security 
Council, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (1996)). 
 111. U.N. Charter art. 96, para. 1. 
 112. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 16 (citing Peace Treaties, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 70 
and Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95, paras. 11-12).  This view is consistent with that of Kelsen 
that the words “within the scope of their activities” of Article 96(2) are redundant because the 
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interpretation, the ICJ would be justifiable in rejecting an advisory 
request by the General Assembly when that action conflicts with one 
taken by the Security Council.  This would be consistent with the ICJ 
construing Article 96(1) with the other concepts and provisions of the 
U.N. Charter, mainly Article 12.  Yet, in practice, the ICJ has chosen 
instead to broaden the power of the General Assembly in relation to 
that of the Security Council. 
The Construction of a Wall opinion addresses this issue.  In the 
opinion, Israel argued that the General Assembly’s advisory opinion 
request was ultra vires because Article 12 of the U.N. Charter forbade 
the G.A. from making recommendations if the situation was on the 
Council’s agenda.113  Israel “claimed that in adopting resolution 1515 
(2003), which endorsed the ‘Roadmap,’ before the adoption by the 
[G.A.] of [G.A. Res. ES-10/14], the [S.C.] continued to exercise its 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security” over the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.114  Given this, the G.A. 
was not entitled to ask for the advisory opinion.115  The ICJ rejected 
Israel’s analysis.  The ICJ noted that traditionally the Security 
Council and the General Assembly had applied and interpreted 
Article 12 such that “the Assembly could not make a 
recommendation on a question concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security while the matter remained on the 
Council’s agenda.”116  Yet, the ICJ noted that this practice had 
subsequently evolved, and now the different bodies could 
simultaneously address different facts of the same matter.  The ICJ 
noted that, while the S.C. may concentrate on the aspects related to 
international peace and security, the G.A. focuses on broader issues, 
considering the humanitarian, social and economic aspects.117 
 
Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over any entity that is not operating within the scope of their 
activity.  See KELSEN, supra note 18, at 546. 
 113. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 25 (citing U.N. Charter art. 12, para. 1) 
(stating that, “[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect to any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so 
requests”).  The Court noted that the “request for the advisory opinion is not itself a 
‘recommendation’ by the General Assembly ‘with regard to [a] dispute or situation.’”  Id.  
However, the ICJ stated that the G.A. adoption of resolution ES-10/14 was the ulra vires act.  
Id. 
 114. Id. para. 29. 
 115. Id. paras. 29-32. 
 116. Id. para. 27. 
 117. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 27. 
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Yet, the bulk of the ICJ’s justification for expanding Article 12 
focused on the G.A.’s own broad interpretation of Article 12.  For 
example, the opinion cited “a response to a question posed by Peru 
during the Twenty-third session of the [G.A.], [where] the Legal 
Counsel of the [U.N.] confirmed that the Assembly interpreted the 
words ‘is exercising the functions’ in [Article 12] as meaning ‘is 
exercising the function at this moment.’”118  The ICJ also noted that 
the G.A. “deemed itself entitled in 1961 to adopt recommendations in 
the matter of the Congo . . . while [this case] still appeared on the 
Council’s agenda.”119  Yet, the ICJ did not perform its own 
interpretative analysis of Article 12.  Rather, the ICJ allowed the 
G.A. to request an advisory opinion on a matter before the Security 
Council because the G.A. had determined that it had the authority to 
do so.120 
Israel also contended that advisory opinion request was ultra 
vires because “it did not fulfill the essential [procedural] conditions 
set by the [G.A. Res. 377 A(V) United for Peace resolution], under 
which the Tenth Emergency Special Session was convened.”121  Israel 
argued that 377 A(V)  required the emergency special session to only 
be convened within twenty-four hours of the Secretary-General 
receiving a request for the session from the Security Council.  Israel 
stated that because the specific issue had “never been brought before 
the [Security] Council, the General Assembly could not rely on any 
inaction by the Council to make such a request.”122  Yet, the ICJ held 
that the Tenth Emergency Special Session was properly reconvened, 
and thus the G.A. could adopt “any resolution falling within the 
subject-matter for which the Session had been convened . . . including 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The Court further limited the power of the Security Council by determining that 
Article 24 of the Charter, describing the Security Council as having “primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security,” referred only to primary, not exclusive 
jurisdiction.  Id. para. 26. 
 121. Id. para. 29.  See also U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 302d plen. mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1481 
(1950) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/1481] (“If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of 
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to make appropriate recommendations to Members for collective 
measures.”).  It has been used ten times since its inception.  See A U.N. Alternative to War: 
“Uniting for Peace”, Feb. 10, 2003, http://www.warpeace.org/article.php?story=200401201 
33120352. 
 122. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 29. 
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a resolution seeking the Court’s opinion.”123  The ICJ argued that at 
the time of the Tenth Emergency Special Session the S.C. had been 
unable to make a decision on the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
because of the negative votes of the permanent member, and that 
there did exist a threat to international peace and security.124  This 
determination by the ICJ eroded the power of the Security Council to 
determine when such threats exist.125 
The ICJ further stated that there had been no procedural 
irregularities because the Emergency Special Session “appear[ed] to 
have been convened in accordance with Rule 9(b) of the Rules of 
Procedure of the General Assembly, and the relevant meetings had 
been convened in pursuance of the applicable rules.”126  The ICJ, as 
with the interpretation of Article 12, deferred to the General 
Assembly because they complied with the 377 process, but the ICJ 
ignored that that process in itself may be ultra vires.  In 377, the 
General Assembly gave itself the power to override the Security 
Council in instances where a lack of unanimity causes the Security 
Council not to fulfill its obligations for maintaining peace and 
security.127  The ICJ did not address whether the General Assembly 
was authorized to give itself this power. 
Overall, the ICJ’s advisory power indicates the role that the ICJ 
has in shaping the dynamics between the different organs of the 
United Nations.  The ICJ has not only broadened its advisory 
jurisdiction but, as evidenced by its accepting the Construction of a 
Wall opinion, the ICJ has changed the interpretation of U.N. Charter 
provisions to increase its advisory power.  The human rights 
considerations of Construction of a Wall may have factored into that 
 
 123. Id. paras. 31-32. 
 124. Id. para. 31. 
 125. See U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1 (describing the Security Council as having “primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”). 
 126. Construction of the Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 35.  The Court pointed to its Namibia 
opinion where it stated that a  “resolution of a properly constituted organ of the United Nations 
which is passed in accordance with that organ’s rules of procedure, and is declared by its 
President to have been so passed, must be presumed to have been validly adopted.”  Id. (citing 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 
I.C.J 16 (June 21, 1971)).  The Court also concluded that no reason for rebutting this 
presumption was presented in this case.  Id. para. 35.  However, the Namibia opinion dealt with 
the procedural requirements of the Security Council to request an advisory opinion; thus, 
indicating that the Court affords the same latitude to the General Assembly as it does the 
Security Council. 
 127. See U.N. Doc. A/1481377(V), supra note 121. 
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opinion, as the ICJ attempted to stretch the Charter’s written 
procedural limitations to fit the United Nations’ overall mandate.  
This indicates that the ICJ may be a useful in providing a pathway to 
address those political issues that the Security Council does not 
address because of its inherent politicization.  Yet, without state 
support from the country’ affected by the opinions, the ICJ efforts 
may ultimately fail given its lack of enforcement power.  For example, 
at the end of the Construction of a Wall opinion, the ICJ recognized 
that the General Assembly and the Security Council should consider 
further action needed to terminate the illegal situation resulting from 
the wall’s construction.128  On July 20, 2004, the General Assembly 
“overwhelmingly adopted” a resolution by a 150-6 vote with 10 
abstentions “demanding that Israel comply with the ICJ ‘advisory 
opinion’” on the “Apartheid” Wall.129 
The General Assembly Resolution indicates that the G.A. finds 
the advisory opinion to be authoritatively binding upon Israel.  The 
ICJ is thus implicitly empowering the General Assembly to overrule 
the Security Council on issues of human rights.  Yet, the Security 
Council is the only organ that can declare military action under the 
U.N. Charter,130 and it has taken no action against Israel.131  This in 
turn may render the overall objectives of the ICJ moot.  Without 
Seucirty Council enforcement, the ICJ will have to rely on individual 
states to willingly adhere to its advisory opinions.  This is less likely to 
occur in situations where the ICJ accepts an opinion in blatant 
disregard of a state’s valid objections.  For instance, Israel has not 
responded favorably to the Construction of a Wall opinion.  It has 
“acknowledged that it had international legal obligations; however, it 
asserted that the request for the advisory opinion improperly 
 
 128. Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 162. 
 129. UN General Assembly Resolution “Acknowledging” the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on 
Israel’s Apartheid Wall on 9 July 2004, PALESTINE MEDIA CENTER, Mar. 21, 2006, 
http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=11&id=84. 
 130. U.N. Charter ch. VII.  See also Warren Hoge, Remove Wall, Israel Is Told by the U.N., 
NY TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A10 (“Resolutions from the 191-member General Assembly are 
nonbinding and largely symbolic, unlike those passed by the 15-member Security Council.  
Israel said in advance that the vote would not alter its resolve to continue building the 
barrier.”). 
 131. See U.N. Experts Mark Anniversary of ICJ ‘Wall Opinion’, Call on Israel Halt 
Construction of Wall, U.S. FED. NEWS, Aug. 4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12403177 (stating 
that, since the G.A. resolution, neither the G.A. nor the S.C. has taken any measure to seek 
compliance with the ICJ opinion). 
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politicized the Court and its functions [emphasis added].”132  Israel has 
also noted that the conflict in the Middle East would also not be 
resolved unless the Palestinians owned up to their responsibilities, 
“including abandoning terror as one of its strategies.”133  It is, in fact, 
evident from the ISC’s decision in Mara’abe that Israel believes the 
ICJ incorrectly categorized the security threat that Israel faces from 
the Palestinian terrorists.134  In regards to the Construction of a Wall 
opinion, the Israeli ambassador stated that “we have indeed reached 
the point where the inmates are running the asylum.”135  Without 
independent enforcement power, the ICJ’s actual effectiveness will be 
blocked as long as states find the advisory process illegitimate.  
B. The Practical Effect of the Court’s Advisory Opinions 
The effects of the ICJ’s opinions on political issues have been 
small.136  For example, in the Reparations case, the Secretary General 
successfully recovered the United Nations’ reparation claim from 
Israel but failed to recover from any other states involved.137  The 
second phase of the Peace Treaties opinion had no practical effect on 
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania because at no point in time did it 
recognize the Assembly’s or the ’ICJ’s right to consider the question, 
 
 132. Fr. Robert J. Araujo, Implementation of the ICJ Advisory Opinion—Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Fences [Do 
Not] Make Good Neighbors?, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349, 389 (2004). 
 133. Id. at 389. 
 134. See Mara’abe, HCJ 7957/04, paras. 59-61 (stating that the ICJ “was not persuaded that 
the route of the wall . . . is necessary for achieving” Israel’s security objectives because of how 
the proceedings were conducted and the inconclusive factual information the court relied on).  
The ISC further stated that the information Israel presented to the court on terrorism and its 
repercussions did not “find their way to the opinion itself.”  Id. para. 63. 
 135. Araujo, supra note 132, at 391 (citing Press Release, General Assembly, General 
Assembly Emergency Session Postpones Action on Draft Resolution Concerning Israel’s 
Separation Barrier, U.N. Doc. GA/10247 (July 19, 2004)).  The Ambassador noted that the 
“Palestinian Authority was in no position to preach to anyone about law and order.”  Id. 
 136. PRATAP, supra note 5, at 249.  See ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 24 (stating that “[s]everal 
of the Court’s judgments and advisory opinions . . . have in the end not been successful in terms 
of laying the basis for the resolution of the political difficulties in connection with which they 
were requested”).  But see Speech of ICJ Judge Shi, supra note 24 (discussing the Court’s 
success in clarifying legal parameters, determining the current status of particular principles and 
rules of international law, and settling points of law of international organizations).  See also id. 
(discussing the importance of international organizations accessing advisory jurisdiction because 
those entities have no recourse to the court’s contentious jurisdiction). 
 137. PRATAP, supra note 5, at 250-51.  The Court interpreted its advisory jurisdiction 
broadly in the Reparation Advisory Opinion.  See id.  It stated that the United Nations 
possessed the “international personality” to advance “international claims against states,” 
whether or not members of the organization.  Id. 
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thus refusing to appoint their representatives in compliance with the 
opinion.138  The South West Africa opinion may have clarified the 
complicated legal issue, but it had “no effect in solving the 
problem.”139  Israel has not ceased construction of its wall in light of 
the ICJ advisory opinion against it.140 
Yet, in contrast, the majority of advisory opinions by the 
Permanent Court of International Justice were effective.141  Several of 
the opinions helped further the work of the League Council and some 
led to the settling of the disputes that gave rise to the request.142  
Further, its “renowned dicta” had significant impact on international 
law, including “the interpretation and application of the Paris Peace 
Treaties, tensions regarding German minorities, the status of Danzig 
and ILO requests concerning conditions for working women.”143  
During the PCIJ, it was also noted that the advisory proceedings were 
sometimes used as a compromise instead of taking a contentious 
route.144 
The perceived effectiveness of the PCIJ and the ineffectiveness 
of the ICJ can be explained by the voting process for obtaining an 
advisory opinion in each court.  Under the League of Nations, votes 
on substantive issues required unanimity or virtual unanimity, while 
procedural matters required only a simple majority.145  The PCIJ 
never clearly categorized an advisory opinion request as substantive 
or procedural, yet the PCIJ was cautious not to allow advisory 
opinions when one party expressed opposition.146  For example, the 
 
 138. Id. at 251. 
 139. Id. at 252.  Yet, it may have played a role in containing the situation.  Id. 
 140. See infra Part II.A for an analysis of Mara’abe, discussing the Israeli continuation of 
building the wall. 
 141. PRATAP, supra note 5, at 248. 
 142. Id. at 249 (citing the decision in the Nationality Decrees, the Jaworzina, and the Railway 
Traffic between Lithuania and Poland cases as leading to settlement of disputes between the 
states concerned).  But see id. (pointing out that the decision on the Mosul case had no effect, as 
Turkey refused to accept the opinion which was given without its consent).  Pratap further notes 
that even in cases such as the Austro-German Customs Unions case, although the parties 
dropped the proposal for the Customs Union two days before its delivery by the Court, the 
process of the Council requesting and the Court giving the opinion gave the politicians time to 
reach a solution even without aid of the opinion.  Id. 
 143. Speech of ICJ Judge Shi, supra note 24. 
 144. Id. (citing Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and 
Braila, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 14 (Dec. 8) (during which a settlement was reached after 
Romania rejected adjudication via the contentious procedure)). 
 145. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 88. 
 146. Id. at 88 n.26 (citing Frontier between Turkey and Iraq Case, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 
12 (Nov. 21)). 
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PCIJ declined to give an advisory opinion when one state opposed 
the opinion because “it was then not a member of the League and the 
request involved its interests.”147  In comparison, U.N. organs and its 
agencies’ organs request advisory opinions only after having the 
required majority vote.148  Further, in the G.A., the United Nations 
replaced the unanimity rule on substantive issues with a rule requiring 
a 2/3 majority of those present and voting on “important questions.”149  
Other issues require a simple majority of members who are present 
and voting.150  It is not clear whether advisory opinion requests are 
classified as “important questions,” but it appears that they are not, 
and, therefore, they only require a simple majority of present and 
voting members.151  ECOSOC requires a majority of the members 
present and voting to make a decision.152  The Security Council 
requires “a majority of nine out of fifteen, including all five of the 
permanent members.”153  Specialized agencies also require majority 
vote.154  Overall, without the unanimity rule, a decision on an advisory 
request can be made against the strong opposition of a number of 
States, even if those states’ interests are concerned.155  This illustrates 
the factual bias that Israel noted in the Construction of a Wall 
opinion. 
C. Other Ways the ICJ’s Advisory Jurisdiction Is Broadened 
The ICJ’s use of its advisory power has other effects.  First, not 
all members of the United Nations give compulsory jurisdiction to the 
 
 147. Id. at 88 n.27 (citing Status of the Eastern Carelia).  Cf. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 307 
(stating that the “prospects that the [ICJ] will refuse to give an opinion because of the absence 
of state consent are remote”).  An illustration of this can be found in the cases discussed supra, 
such as Construction of a Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 131, para. 1. 
 148. Romano, supra note 16, at 23. 
 149. U.N. Charter art. 18, para. 2. 
 150. Id. para. 3; Romano, supra note 16, at 23. 
 151. Romano, supra note 16, at 23 (citing G.A. Res. 49/75(k), A/Res/49/75(k), (Dec. 15, 
1994)) (referring to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons adopted by the General 
Assembly by a vote of 78-43-38). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 88.  See, e.g., id. at 177 (citing WHO Regional Headquarters 
opinion (1980), with a vote of 53 to 43, and 20 abstentions, as “the highest number and the 
highest percentage of negative votes on any resolution requesting an advisory opinion in any 
body to date”). 
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ICJ.156  This raises issues of the ICJ using advisory jurisdiction to get 
around compulsory jurisdiction.  It also allows states who do not give 
the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction to use advisory jurisdiction to make 
political points without making themselves liable before the court.157  
Second, the ICJ’s jurisdiction is broadened when entities without the 
power to request advisory opinions encourage organs that have 
advisory jurisdiction to request an opinion.  For instance, in Legal 
Status of United Nations Rapporteur, the advisory opinion request 
came in a roundabout manner, as the Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities had to get 
ECOSOC to request the opinion.158  This raised questions as to 
whether the circle for international organs allowed to request 
opinions should be widened.159  Yet, the ICJ’s opinion in the WHO 
Nuclear Weapons opinion highlighted that the ICJ will limit organs 
granted advisory jurisdiction under 96(2).160 
Third, the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ has been increased in 
the form of “binding” advisory opinions.  There are two types of 
binding opinions.  First, although advisory opinions should not be 
binding, they could be binding if a competent international organ 
adopted the advisory opinion.161  If the international organ adopted 
the advisory opinion, there would be no way to distinguish it from any 
other resolution of that organ.162  Second, in Binding Advisory 
 
 156. See United Nations, International Court of Justice Documents, available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicUNmembers.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2006) (indicating the number of countries that give compulsory jurisdiction to the ICJ as 
65 out of 191). 
 157. For example, as of 2006, 65/191 of the countries in the G.A. grant the ICJ compulsory 
jurisdiction.  Id.  Yet, 111 states have voted to request the Construction of the Wall opinion.  
United Nations, General Assembly, Emergency Special Sessions, at 21, 
http://www.un.org/ga/documents/liemsps.htm (follow “10th session” hyperlink; then follow 
“A/ES-10/PV.23” hyperlink) (noting that the vote was 111 to 7, with 55 abstentions).  It is also 
important to note that, out of the Uniting Resolution’s twenty-eight sponsors, only five 
(Djibouti, Egypt, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan) have issued declarations in recognition of the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction.  See United Nations, International Court of Justice Documents, available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicUNmembers.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2006). 
 158. ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 191. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 209 (noting that the Court held that, for the purposes of Article 96(2), the WHO’s 
activities in regards to use of nuclear weapons would be the same whether they were legal or 
illegal). 
 161. Id. at 236. 
 162. Id.  See discussion supra Part II.A (noting this was demonstrated above with the 
General Assembly Resolution ordering Israel to comply with the ICJ advisory opinion on the 
Construction of the Wall). 
04__CALIDONIO SCHMID.DOC 8/1/2006  3:03 PM 
2006] ADVISORY OPINIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 443 
Opinions of the International Court of Justice, former ICJ judge 
Roberto Ago highlighted the possible use of “special advisory 
procedures” leading to “compulsive opinions.”163  He noted that there 
are: 
[C]ertain provisions, designed for the purpose, that are contained in 
instruments other than the Charter and the Statute and were 
adopted separately by the United Nations itself or other institutions 
within the UN system, resort to the procedure may pursue a more 
ambitious aim, namely to settle a dispute to which one of those 
institutions is a party.164 
In the Administrative Tribunal of the International Law Organization 
upon Complaints Made against U.N. Economic and Social Council 
Organization,165 the ICJ first considered whether it should comply 
with an advisory request given under a provision that would make the 
opinion binding.  This arguably went beyond the scope attributed by 
the U.N. Charter and by the Statute of the Court to an Advisory 
Opinion. Yet, the ICJ stated that the “[t]he existence . . . of a dispute 
the parties to which may be affected as a consequence of the ICJ’s 
opinion, does not change the advisory nature of the ICJ’s task, which 
is to answer the questions put to it.” 166  The ICJ thus chose to ignore 
the larger implications of the “binding” advisory opinion.167 
 
 163. Robert Ago, Binding Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, 85 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 439, 440 (1991). 
 164. Id. at 439. 
 165. In Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints made 
against UNESCO, Advisory Opinion, 1956 I.C.J. 77 (Oct. 23). 
 166. Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, 1973 I.C.J. 171, para. 14 (July 12). 
 167. Ago, supra note 1633, at 440.  Scholars do not agree on whether “binding” advisory 
opinions would have a res judicata binding effect as foreseen in Article 59 of the ICJ.  Id.  
Rosenne “regarded with caution the notion that such an opinion can be placed on exactly the 
same footing as a decision rendered in a contentious proceeding.”  Id. (citing S. ROSENNE, THE 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 683 (2d rev. ed. 1985)).  Yet, 
Paolo Benvenuit supports the view that “the two procedures and their results are by and large 
equivalent.”  Ago, supra note 1633, at 440 (citing P. BENVENUTI, L’ACCERTAMENTO DEL 
DIRITTO MEDIANTE I PARERI CONSULTIVI DELLA CORTE INTERNAZIONALE DI GUISTIZIA 
(1985)).  It was also an important oversight of the ICJ because the case represented an “indirect 
means” to overcome the inability of the UNESCO, an international organization, to institute 
contentious procedure of the ICJ to settle a dispute where it was a party.  Id. 
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III.  THE IACHR’S ADVISORY JURISDICTION IN PRACTICE 
A. The IACHR’s Interpretation 
The IACHR has interpreted its power to oversee and intervene 
in the domestic realm of states broadly.168  Advisory opinion requests 
may encompass the interpretation of the American Convention and 
other human rights treaties applicable in the territory of the member 
states of the OAS.169  In Other Treaties, Peru asked the IACHER to 
interpret the phrase “or of other treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights in the American States.”170  The IACHR held that 
“other treaties” meant: 
[A]ny provision dealing with the protection of human rights set 
forth in any international treaty applicable in the American States, 
regardless of whether it be bilateral or multilateral, whatever be the 
principal purpose of such a treaty, and whether or not non-Member 
States of the inter-American system are or have the right to become 
parties thereto.171 
The IACHR further held that a treaty deals with the protection 
of human rights when it “has bearing upon, affects or is of interest” in 
the area of human rights.172  The IACHR thus held that is has the 
“jurisdiction to interpret, in addition to the American Convention, 
‘other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American States.’”173 The IACHR has also interpreted its procedural 
rules liberally by allowing the use of amicus briefs.174  This has allowed 
human rights organizations to play an active role in the proceedings.175  
The IACHR did note that it maintained discretionary power to 
decline a request for an advisory opinion due to the special 
circumstances of the case or because: 
 
 168. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 242. 
 169. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  Compare with discussion of ECHR limiting 
advisory proceedings to procedural issues supra Part I. 
 170. See “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory 
Opinion, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, para. 8 [hereinafter Other Treaties]. 
 171. Id. para. 52. 
 172. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 72. 
 173. Id. para. 69; see also id. para. 76 (stating that “a treaty can concern the protection of 
human rights, regardless of what the principal purpose of that treaty might be”) (emphasis in 
original); Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 267 (stating that “this interpretation grants the court an 
extremely broad jurisdiction to interpret human rights provisions”). 
 174. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 280. 
 175. Id. 
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[T]he issues raised deal[t] mainly with international obligations 
assumed by a non-American State or with the structure or 
operation of international organs or bodies outside the inter-
American system, or because granting the request might have the 
effect of altering or weakening the system established by the 
Convention in a manner detrimental to the individual human 
being.176 
Further, the IACHR said it would not give an advisory opinion when 
the issue raised by a request is a jurisdictional question that would 
“be used for purely academic speculation, without a foreseeable 
application to concrete situations justifying the need for an advisory 
opinion.”177 
Unlike the ICJ, the IACHR refused to exercise jurisdiction for 
political reasons.178  In Compatibility of Draft Legislation, Costa Rica 
asked the IACHR whether its draft legislation establishing a court of 
criminal appeals and providing for the right to appeal complied with 
the requirements of Article 8(2)(h) of the Inter-American 
Convention of Human Rights.179  Yet, claimants had cases pending 
before the Human Rights Commission involving the same provision.  
The IACHR said it had jurisdiction but refused to exercise such 
jurisdiction because the question presented “could produce, under 
the guise of an advisory opinion, a determination of contentious 
matters not yet referred to the Court, without providing the victims 
with the opportunity to participate in the proceedings.”180  The 
IACHR’s judicial restraint in that matter may be explained because, 
unlike the ICJ, the IACHR allows states to ask for advisory opinions.  
In this regard, the IACHR must be more diligent in monitoring for 
possible substitution of the advisory process for the contentious.  The 
IACHR has issued two main questionable interpretations of its 
advisory power. 
 
 176. Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 6 (citing Other Treaties, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) 
No. 1, paras. 22-25). 
 177. Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, 1987 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, 
paras. 16, 17 (Oct. 8, 1987). 
 178. See Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 274 [hereinafter Compatibility of Draft Legislation] 
(citing Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 12, para. 28 (Dec. 6, 1991)). 
 179. Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 12, para. 2. 
 180. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 275 (citing Compatibility of Draft Legislation, 1991 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 12, para. 28). 
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1. The Court’s Interpretation of the Treaty Provision of 64(1).  
Two recent opinions of the IACHR indicate the breadth the IACHR 
attaches to its advisory process under the Treaty provision.  First, the 
IACHR ruled on the advisory opinion from the Commission on the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) Treaty (1999)181 
despite the fact that the matter was before the ICJ.  Some states 
believe that, if cases overlap between the IACHR and the ICJ, the 
IACHR should not act because there is a risk of inconsistency 
between the findings of the tribunals.182  Yet, the IACHR in the 
Consular Relations case proceeded anyway.183  The IACHR held that 
it is “not unusual to find that on certain occasions courts reach 
conflicting or at the very least different conclusions in interpreting the 
same rule of law.”184  The IACHR held that “it could not be 
restrained from exercising its advisory jurisdiction because of 
contentious cases filed with the ICJ” because it is an “autonomous 
judicial institution.”185  The IACHR also noted that Paraguay had 
pulled its case regarding the VCCR from the ICJ.  Further, Germany 
had filed the La Grande case regarding the interpretation of the 
VCCR in March 1999, more than a year after Mexico submitted its 
 
 181. See Right to Information on Consular Assistance, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
16, para. 1 [hereinafter Consular Relations]. 
 182. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 278-79.  See also ROSENNE, supra note 7, at 240 (“[A] 
regional court or tribunal of limited jurisdiction, both ratione personae and ratione materiae, 
should show the greatest restraint before embarking upon the hazardous and delicate task of 
interpreting the application of a universal instrument adopted under the auspice of the United 
Nations, and which itself provides for the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.  The 
fact that the advisory opinion was requested by an interested state in the context of a pending 
contentious case on the same issue in the International Court of Justice is an added reason for 
caution.”). 
 183. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 61.  It is also 
important to note that the United States did not argue that the IACHR had trespassed its 
jurisdiction by giving an opinion on a question before the ICJ when it interpreted Article 36 of 
the VCCR.  Monica Feria Tinta, Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations: Arguing the LaGrand Case, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. No. 2 
(quoting T. Buergenthal, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 220 (2nd ed. 1995) 
(1988)), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol12/No2/sr2.rtf (last visited Feb 10, 2006).  
The United States is not a member of the American Convention and probably did not represent 
itself to demonstrate that it thought the IACHR proceedings were without legal merit.  See id.  
Yet, Monica Tinta notes that, by not challenging the court’s jurisdiction, the United States left 
unchallenged the real “legal value” of the opinion.  Id.  She argues that “one should thus bear in 
mind that the fact that the IACHR has made a pronouncement in an advisory opinion rather 
than a contentious case ‘does not diminish the legitimacy or authoritative character of the legal 
principle enunciated.’”  Id. 
 184. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 61 (citing Other 
Treaties, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, para. 50). 
 185. Id. para. 61. 
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request for the advisory opinion and eight months after the IACHR 
concluded the oral phase of their proceedings.186 
The IACHR also stated that “the possibility of conflicting 
interpretations is a phenomenon common to all those legal system 
that have certain courts which are not hierarchically integrated.”187  
Yet, the IACHR failed to focus on the fact that the treaty it was 
asked to interpret, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 
had an optional protocol referring disputes and cases to the ICJ.  
Thus, the contractual parties to the treaty had indeed designated an 
apparatus or judicial body to handle problems arising under the 
treaty.188  This presented ample reason for the IACHR to use its 
discretionary power. 
The Consular Relations189 opinion was also controversial because 
it involved a treaty that some argued was not related to human 
rights.190  Although the United States did not present arguments in the 
Consular Relations opinion, in the LaGrande case before the I.C.J., 
the United States argued that Article 36(1) of the Consular Relations 
treaty was not connected to human rights, but reciprocity.191  The 
United States stated that reciprocity was an alien concept to human 
rights, and that Article 36(1) could not contain a human right because 
it was subject to the rules of reciprocity.192  A national of a state that 
has not ratified the Convention would not be entitled to the 
Convention.193  The United States further argued that the VCCR 
established legal rules governing relations between states, not rules 
that operate between states and individuals.194  In the Consular 
Relations opinion, the IACHR rejected this line of argument.  The 
 
 186. Id. para. 56. 
 187. Id. para. 61 (citing Other Treaties, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1; para. 50.) 
 188. Tinta, supra note 1833. 
 189. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 1. 
 190. Tinta, supra note 1833, Sec. C (stating that the United States argued that the VCCR 
was not related to human rights).  The decision involved the applicability of Article 36(1) of the 
Consular Relations Treaty to the obligations of the United States over Mexican prisoners being 
prosecuted without having the rights afford in the Treaty.  Id. section B.  The United States did 
not challenge the opinion.  The decision was unanimous.  El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican 
Republic, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and Honduras all made representations for this case.  Id. 
 191. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 16, at 15, para. 26. 
 192. Tinta, supra note 1833. 
 193. Id. (noting that in the judgment in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in the 
Tehran, the ICJ stated that “the obligations of the Iranian Government here in question are not 
merely contractual obligations established by the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, but 
also obligations under general international law.”). 
 194. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 26. 
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IACHR held that the relevant portions of the Vienna Convention 
conferred rights on individuals and found that those rights qualified 
as human rights.195  Thus, although the Vienna Convention was not a 
human rights treaty per se, the IACHR exercised jurisdiction because 
it held that the Article 36 provisions were applicable to the protection 
of individual human rights within the territory of member states of 
the Inter-American system.196 
The Consular Relations opinion was also important because the 
IACHR was interpreting a non-regional treaty.  The IACHR found 
that it had the power to review treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights in the American States, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.197  Initially, scholars remained 
optimistic about the effects of the IACHR’s jurisdiction over a non-
regional, quasi-human rights treaty.  They noted that, after the 
opinion, the U.S. Department of State disseminated a handbook to all 
local, state and federal law enforcement departments in the U.S. 
explaining the importance of compliance with the procedures 
required by the Vienna Convention.198  Yet, later the United States 
announced its decision to pull out of the Optional Protocol to the 
VCCR.199  The Protocol gave the ICJ jurisdiction to make the final 
decision over the Treaty.200 
The United States withdrew to protect “against future 
International Court of Justice Judgments that might similarly 
interpret the consular convention or disrupt our domestic criminal 
system.”201  Although the U.S. action does not directly implicate the 
IACHR opinion, it suggests that an aggressive jurisprudence in 
human rights might not have the satisfactory effect the IACHR would 
hope for.  It also indicates that the United States does not take the 
IACHR advisory opinion as precedent; but rather, that by severing its 
responsibility under the Protocol, it believes it is no longer subject to 
international judicial intervention in its domestic actions. 
 
 195. Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 268 (citing Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 16, paras. 74, 82, 84, 86-87). 
 196. Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, para. 124. 
 197. Id. paras. 36-38. 
 198. See, e.g., Pasqualucci, supra note 2, at 242. 
 199. Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A1, 
A10. 
 200. Id.  The United States initially backed the measure.  Id.  It was also the first country to 
invoke the protocol before the ICJ when it sued Iran in 1979.  Id. 
 201. Id. 
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The IACHR’s other controversial opinion involving the treaty 
provision occurred in Juridical Condition and Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants (2003).202  In the opinion, Mexico sought an 
advisory opinion on the status of undocumented workers under 
international law.203  The request came in May 2002 as the Mexican 
government’s reaction to the U.S. Hoffman Plastics decision.204  Rights 
of the Undocumented Migrants represented one of the first times a 
member state sought a ruling on an issue tied to the practice of 
another state.205  Yet, Mexico tailored the request generically, 
claiming the Mexican nationals as “working outside Mexico,” even 
though almost all Mexican emigrants were in the United States.206  By 
doing so, Mexico did not directly implicate the United States. 207  
Mexico also did not address Hoffman Plastics directly, addressing it 
only in a footnote.208 
The IACHR unanimously held that every migrant worker was 
entitled to non-discrimination and equality before the law, no matter 
what his migratory status might be, and that every migrant worker is 
entitled to due process.209  Law Professor Beth Lyon argued that the 
IACHR focused on the problem as a potential violation of the 
international right to non-discrimination and equality before the law 
and, in doing so, declined the opportunity to develop economic, 
 
 202. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion, 
2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, para. 1 (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Undocumented 
Migrants]. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 137 (2002) 
(holding that it was beyond the National Labor Relations Board’s remedial discretion to award 
back pay to an undocumented alien employee who was not legally authorized to work in the 
United States because a back pay award ran counter to federal immigration policy). 
 205. See Beth Lyon, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines Unauthorized 
Migrant Worker’s Rights for the Hemisphere: A Comment on Advisory Opinion 18, 28 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & CHANGE 547, 565 (2004). 
 206. Id. at 566. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Lyon, supra note 205, at 566.  In addition to the Mexican government, governments of 
Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua offered written and oral 
interventions in OC-18.  Several inter-governmental organizations intervened in the case as 
well, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Consejo 
Centroamericano de Procuradores de Derechos Humanos, the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees.  Other representatives from civil society, including eleven universities, two private 
law firms, and fifty-seven non-governmental organizations.  Id. at 567-88.  U.S. government 
never spoke publicly, although many of the civil society interveners were U.S.-based. Id. at 568. 
 209. Undocumented Migrants, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, paras. 119, 121. 
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social, and cultural rights law for the region.210  She stated that “this 
may also have reflected a cautious sensibility in advancing workers 
rights on a less controversial legal foundation.”211  She also noted that 
Mexico framed that request to the IACHR in terms of treaty norms 
applicable to the United States, primarily the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.  However, the IACHR does not have to 
limit itself to that application.212  The IACHR has broad advisory 
opinion power; thus it could have sua sponte raised the economic, 
social and cultural rights.213  Its focus on civil and political rights 
reflects a choice not to develop economic and social rights 
jurisprudence.214  Yet, despite the IACHR’s slight to economic, social, 
and cultural rights, the IACHR did broadly expand the overall right, 
holding that the probation on discrimination had risen to the level of 
a jus cogens norm.  Lyon noted that this “decision marked the first 
time that a human rights tribunal has designated nondiscrimination a 
jus cogens norm giving rise to obligations erga onmes.”215  She further 
argued that the implication that non-discrimination of workers is a jus 
cogens norm that may be important for migrant workers in the 
United States, as a jus cogens norm may be invoked in the U.S. 
courts, whereas many treaty provisions may not.216 
Under this analysis, undocumented workers in the United States 
could possibly invoke the Rights of the Undocumented Migrants 
opinion that nondiscrimination is a jus cogens norm under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA).217  The ATCA provides standing to aliens 
who are victims of torts in violation of the law of nations.218  
Violations of the law of nations arguably include violations of jus 
cogens norms.219  Yet, despite Lyon’s optimism, this interpretation 
 
 210. Lyon, supra note 205, at 592.  Lyon notes that the IACHR focused on political rights 
primarily because that is how Mexico and other parties framed the issue.  Id. 
 211. Id. at 585. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See id. at 593 (Other Treaties, 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, para. 29) (When 
interpreting Article 64 of the American Convention, “the Court enjoys an important power of 
appreciation” when deciding whether to grant a request for an advisory opinion, “enabling it to 
weight the circumstances of each case”). 
 214. Id. at 592. 
 215. Lyon, supra note 205, at 586-87. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 594-95. 
 218. Lyon also states that, in the United States, “there appears to be a slight opening toward 
the application of international legal norms.”  Id. at 594.  She notes that the U.S. Supreme Court 
cited international legal sources in addressing individual rights in two 2003 decisions.  Id. 
 219. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
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seems unlikely, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s limitation to the 
ATCA’s in the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain decision (2004).220  In Sosa, 
the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any 
international law norm with less definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when 
§ 1350 was enacted. . . .  This limit upon judicial recognition is 
generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and 
judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court. . . . And the 
determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a 
cause of action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an 
element of judgment about the practical consequences of making 
that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.221 
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated that it will narrowly define the 
laws of nations in accordance with those that existed among civilized 
nation when the law was enacted.  Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme 
Court indicated that its own judges should determine the laws of 
nations in accordance with what is favorable for the federal courts.  
This holding seems to thwart the idea of invoking the Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants advisory opinion holding in American 
courts.  Yet, it still leaves unresolved the larger issue of the IACHR’s 
power to define jus cogens norms per se and whether the IACHR 
interpretation would be usable before the ICJ. 
The Rights of the Undocumented Migrants opinion granted 
unauthorized workers rights beyond pre-existing interpretations of 
international law.222  It corresponded to the IACHR’s broad 
application of its advisory jurisprudence, while at the same time 
raising issues as to the hierarchy among international courts and the 
enforceability of the IACHR’s opinion in domestic courts. 
2. Implications on State Sovereignty.  Critics assert that, by 
interpreting its jurisdiction broadly, the IACHR is interfering with 
state sovereignty.  As discussed above, states argue that contentious 
cases are presented in the disguise of advisory opinions.  This 
criticism is more poignant in the IACHR because states may request 
opinions.  States also object because the Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission may bring a request for an advisory opinion to 
IACHR on a legal issue in dispute with a state that is not party to the 
 
 220. 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004). 
 221. Id. at 732-33. 
 222. Lyon, supra note 2055, at 591. 
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American Convention.  They argue that this is not fair, given that the 
Commission may bring such cases to the IACHR only if the states 
concerned have accepted the IACHR’s’s jurisdiction.223  In 
Restrictions to the Death Penalty,224 the IACHR accepted the 
Commission’s request because its opinion provided the Commission 
with assistance to perform its functions under Art 112 of the OAS.225  
This was true even though Guatemala had not accepted the IACHR’s 
contentious jurisdiction.226  The IACHR argued that its advisory 
jurisdiction offered “an alternate judicial method of consultative 
nature, which is designed to assist states and organs to comply with 
and to apply human rights treaties without subjecting them to the 
formalism . . . associated with the contentious judicial process.”227 
Judge Burgenthal of the ICJ hypothesized that the IACHR’s 
advisory jurisdiction could actually be used by the Commission or any 
interested state in the midst of a pending contentious proceeding.228  
Yet, the IACHR in the Death Penalties opinion stated that using the 
advisory process “might in certain situations interfere with the proper 
functioning of the system of protection spelled out in the Convention 
or it might adversely affect the interests of the victim of the human 
rights violations.”229  Thus, the IACHR maintains its discretionary 
right. 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF ADVISORY OPINIONS 
The analysis indicates that both the ICJ and the IACHR 
interpret their advisory power broadly to oversee a state’s 
implementation of human rights.  Overall, the ICJ and IACHR have 
problems, first, with getting countries to accept compulsory 
jurisdiction and, second, with countries trying to break free from 
compulsory jurisdiction after an adverse ruling.  This suggests that the 
ICJ and the IACHR may be expanding their advisory power to 
indirectly subject those states to an adjudicative process. 
In theory, advisory opinions are non-binding.  Yet, both courts’ 
jurisprudence indicates that their opinions could have binding effects 
 
 223. Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 9 
 224. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3, para. 43. 
 225. Id. para. 37. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. para. 43. 
 228. Burgenthal, supra note 5, at 11. 
 229. Restrictions to the Death Penalty, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 3, para. 36 
(citing to the Other Treaties opinion). 
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through the courts’ development of human rights custom and treaty 
norms.  First, although the advisory opinions are non-binding, the 
courts interpret treaties that are usually binding on the parties 
involved.  For instance, in the Construction of a Wall opinion, the ICJ 
referred to Israeli’s binding obligations under treaty and customary 
law.230  Similarly, in the Rights of the Undocumented Migrants opinion, 
the IACHR interpreted the United States’ obligations under the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, a treaty with 
binding obligations, which the United States had signed and ratified.231  
In this sense, advisory opinions serve to enforce the human rights 
obligations that would otherwise be left unenforceable because there 
is no central organization to oversee their implementation. 
Yet, at the same time, these courts lack any formal enforcement 
mechanism or power.  There is no executive branch of international 
courts, and, as discussed supra, few states willingly comply with the 
advisory opinions.  Yet, the reputation of the courts and their 
interpretation of international law may be undermined when states 
flagrantly violate the courts’ opinions.  Israel illustrated this concern 
when it rejected the Construction of the Wall opinion in Mara’abe.232  
This indicates that the courts’ hesitance to exercise discretion to 
refuse to answer opinions is misplaced.  Since there is a high 
probability that the court’s opinions will be ignored or distinguished, 
they should use their discretion to avoid answering the arguably 
contentious requests.233  Jonathan Carney contends that the ICJ 
should avoid cases where a judgment is likely to be resisted and 
instead establish a record of success in cases where the parties would 
probably live up to their obligations.234 
This could be accomplished by using more judicial discretion in 
accepting advisory requests.  With regard to the ICJ, dismissing cases 
for lack of jurisdiction or because of compelling reasons could lend its 
opinions more credibility.  The ICJ, like the PCIJ, could be more 
cautious in entering opinions against the strong interests of states or 
 
 230. 2004 I.C.J 131, paras. 89-99, 102-12, 123, 134, 136, 137. 
 231. 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, paras. 3, 109, 124, 141(5). 
 232. HCJ 7957/04, para. 58. 
 233. Pomerance, supra note 10, at 318. 
 234. Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice 
Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 435 (2004) (citing Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating 
the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participation, and 
Non-Performance, in INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT CROSSROADS 388 (Lori Fisler 
Damrosch ed. 1987). 
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where a states domestic court is already hearing the issue.  Yet, this 
could undermine the ’ICJ’s desire to deal with questions sometimes 
ignored by the Security Council through politicization and 
polarization.  At a minimum, the ICJ should make sure its opinions 
are based on fair and accurate facts, a concern voiced by Justice 
Burgenthal in his dissent in the Construction of a Wall Opinion and 
the ISC in Mara’abe .235  The situation is more poignant in regards to 
the IACHR.  As a regional court, it must find a footing between the 
ICJ and domestic courts.  Discretion could be more advisable in the 
IACHR, especially on issues already before the ICJ.  It is interesting 
that the IACHR declined jurisdiction when its opinion arguably 
conflicted with the duties of the Commission, but chose to accept a 
case whose subject matter was already directly before the ICJ.236  This 
contradictory result suggests that the IACHR holds its own organs 
above that of other international bodies.  But, it could also mean that 
after Consular Relations, the IACHR will now take a more active role 
in general.  Regardless, judicial restraint could have the affect of 
giving the opinions the courts’ render more credibility and create a 
balance between it and other international courts. 
Both courts also face the criticism that the inmates are now 
running the asylum, meaning that states that live outside the law have 
the power to request opinions on the behavior of states that live 
primarily inside the law.  This could be resolved by the court’s better 
policing the procedural mechanisms invoking the advisory request.  
For instance, in the Construction of a Wall case, many states with 
human rights abuse records, such as the Sudan, who did not afford the 
ICJ contentious jurisdiction voted in favor of the advisory request 
against Israel.237 
Israel correctly argued that there was no such mechanism that 
could bring the Palestinian action under judicial review.  In effect, it 
made the opinion appear one-sided.  On one hand, it would appear 
that the Israeli state with its political and monetary advantage was 
finally put in its place.  Yet, on the other hand, this could have the 
effect of rendering it less likely that states bind themselves to human 
rights treaties in the first place.  This defeats the central theme of 
human rights law, mainly to encourage states to assume the 
 
 235. HCJ 7957/04, paras. 61-64. 
 236. Compare Compatibility of Draft Legislation, 1991 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 12, 
para. 28 with Consular Relations, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 16, paras. 54, 56, 61. 
 237. See discussion supra note 157. 
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obligations in the first place.  For instance, after the Rights of the 
Undocumented Migrants and Consular Relations cases, it is less likely 
that the United States will ratify the American Convention.  In 
comparison, the European Court of Human Rights has a narrow 
advisory jurisdiction, both in theory and in practice.  Yet, unlike the 
ICJ and the IACHR, by statute all states of the ECHR have accepted 
its compulsory jurisdiction.  The ECHR has no need to rule indirectly 
with advisory power, because it has the power to act directly with its 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The ICJ Construction of a Wall opinion and the IACHR 
Consular Relations and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants 
opinions reflect an elevation of individual rights over state rights.  
The ACHPR may also use its advisory power broadly.  Yet, the ICJ 
and IACHR’s aggressive advisory power may only seek to alienate 
states from the courts rather than encourage them to accept 
compulsory jurisdiction.  It may also seek to limit states from 
attaching themselves from human rights treaties or regimes that may 
later be used against them in advisory proceedings.  The courts 
should, therefore, use more discretion in accepting advisory opinion 
requests, especially by monitoring which state or entity is requesting 
the opinion.  The courts should also pay attention to domestic courts 
and how they are responding to similar issues.  This could remove the 
bulk of state criticism over the advisory practice and make the 
opinions that are rendered more effective for the overall enjoyment 
of human rights.  Advisory opinions could thus become more than a 
pyrrhic victory. 
